Abstract. Multireceiver authentication codes allow one sender to construct an authenticated message for a group of receivers such that each receiver can verify authenticity of the received message. In this paper, we give a formal de nition of multireceiver authentication codes, derive information theoretic and combinatorial lower bounds on their performance and give new e cient constructions for such codes, our constructions are based on the linear error-correcting codes.
Multireceiver authentication codes (MRA-codes) 4] extend Simmons' model of unconditionally secure authentication 16] . In an MRA-code 4], a sender wants to authenticate a message for a group of receivers such that each receiver can verify authenticity of the received message. Receivers are not trusted and may try to construct fraudulent messages on behalf of the transmitter. If the fraudulent message is acceptable by even one receiver the attackers have succeeded. This is a useful extension of traditional authentication code and has numerous applications. For example a director wanting to give instructions to employees in an organisation such that each employee is able to verify authenticity of the message. Providing such service using digital signature implies that security relies on unproven assumptions and the attackers have nite amount of computational resources. In unconditionally secure model, there is no computational assumptions or limitations on the attackers' resources. A multireceiver A-code can be trivially constructed using traditional A-codes: the sender shares a common key with each receiver; to send an authenticated message it constructs n codewords, one for each receiver, concatenates them and broadcasts the result. Now each receiver can verify its own codeword and so authenticate the message. In this construction collaboration of even n ? 1 receivers does not help them in constructing a message that is acceptable by the n th receiver simply because the n codewords are independently constructed. If we assume that the size of the malicious groups cannot be too large, for example the biggest number of collaborators is w ? 1 (where w < n), then we can expect to save on the size of the key and the length of the codeword because codewords can have dependencies. This is the basis of attempting to construct codes that are more e cient than the trivial one. The rst two constructions of (w; n) MRA-codes, given in 4], are based on polynomials over nite elds and nite geometries. DFY description of MRA-codes is basically a de nition of its functionality: that is the way the code works. Kurosawa and Obana (KO) 10] studied (w; n) MRA-code, derived combinatorial lower bounds on the probability of success in impersonation and substitution attacks, and characterised Cartesian MRA-codes that satisfy the bound with equality. In this paper we start by giving a more general de nition of MRA-codes which is a natural generalisation of KO's de nition. Next we derive the rst information theoretic bounds on the probability of success in impersonation and substitution attacks. The bounds are used to obtain combinatorial bounds on the the number of keys of the transmitter and receivers and also the size of the tag. These latter bounds are generalisations of KO bounds to MRA-systems that are not perfect. Finally, we present two new constructions for MRA-codes using linear errorcorrecting codes (E-codes). The constructions are particularly important because they give MRA-codes from arbitrary E-codes and can be seen as extension of Johansson et al 9] work relating E-codes and A-codes. This established link allows us to apply bounds and constructions from the well-developed discipline of E-codes to the construction of new MRA-systems. Using maximum distance separable codes in the rst construction, and special values for parameters in the second, results in new optimal MRA-codes that satisfy lower bounds on the size of keys and the tag. Besides DFY's original polynomial construction, these are the only other known optimal constructions for MRA-codes. The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 provides basic de nitions and reviews known results. In section 2 we de ne MRA-codes and derive information theoretic and combinatorial bounds. In section 3 we rst recall DFY polynomial construction and then propose two e cient constructions from linear errorcorrecting codes. Finally in Section 4 we summarise our results.
Preliminaries
In Simmons' model of unconditionally secure authentication there are three participants: a transmitter (sender), a receiver, and an opponent. The transmitter and the receiver share a secret key and are both assumed honest. The message is sent over a public channel which is subject to active attack. Transmitter and receiver use an authentication code which is a set of authentication functions f, indexed by a key belonging to a set E. To authenticate a message called a source state and denoted by s 2 S, using a key e, transmitter forms a codeword f(e; s) and sends it to the receiver who can verify its authenticity using his knowledge of the key.
De nition1. An authentication code C is a 4-tuple (S; M; E; f), where f is a mapping from S E to M, f : S E ?! M such that f(s; e) = m and f(s 0 ; e) = m imply s = s 0 .
In a systematic Cartesian A-code the codeword corresponding to a source state s using e 2 E is the concatenation of s and an authentication tag t 2 T , that is m = (s; t). The receiver will detect a fraudulent codeword (s; t) if the tag that it calculates for s using its secret key e is di erent from the received tag t. The opponent can perform an impersonation, or a substitution, attack by constructing a fraudulent codeword and succeeds if the codeword is acceptable by the receiver. In impersonation the attacker has not seen any previous communication while in substitution he has seen one transmitted codeword. A code provides perfect protection against impersonation if enemy's best strategy is randomly guessing a codeword. In the case of Cartesian A-codes, enemy's probability of success is P I = 1 jT j . Perfect protection for substitution is de ned in a similar way, it requires the enemy's best strategy to be randomly selecting one of the remainder codewords. For Cartesian A-codes the probability of success of the intruder must be P S = 1 jT j . An extension of this model, proposed by Desmedt, Frankel and Yung (DFY) 4], is when there are multiple receivers. The system works as follows. First the key distribution centre(KDC) distributes secret keys to the transmitter and each receiver. Next the transmitter broadcasts a message to all the receivers who can individually verify authenticity of the message using their secret key information. There are malicious groups of receivers who use their secret keys and all the previous communications in the system to construct fraudulent messages. They succeed in their attack even if a single receiver accepts the message as being authentic. KO formalisation of (w; n) MRA-codes is as follows. Let E 1 , E 2 ::; E n denote the set of decoding rules of receivers R 1 ; R n , and S and M denote the set of source states and senders codewords, respectively. De nition2. ( 10] ) We say that (S; M; E 1 ; E n ) is a (w; n) multireceiver Acode if for 8(E i1 ; E iw ) and 8(e 1 ; e w ), P(E iw = e w jE i1 = e 1 ; E iw?1 = e w?1 ) = P(E iw = e w ):
The probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks, P I and P S , for (w; n) MRA-code are then de ned as the best chance of success in impersonation and substitution attacks, respectively, against a single (arbitrary) receiver. KO characterised Cartesian MRA-codes that satisfy P I = P S = 1= w p q and observed that DFY polynomial construction is in fact an optimal construction and has the least number of keys for the transmitter and the receivers and requires the smallest tag size for the authenticator.
De nition 2 only requires that the set of keys for any set of w receivers be independent. This property ensures that the probability of success in impersonation attack by any w ? 1 receivers against a single other receiver is the same as that by an (outside) opponent. However, it does not imply a similar property for substitution, as will be shown in Example 1. (Contrary to KO's claim in page 207 10].) We give a more general de nition for MRA-codes that has KO's de nition as a special case, and derive information theoretic combinatorial lower bounds on P I and P S for such codes. These are the rst information theoretic bounds for MRA-codes.
Model and Bounds
An MRA-System has three phases:
1. Key distribution: The KDC (key distribution centre) privately transmits the key information to the sender and each receiver(the sender can also be the KDC).
2. Broadcast: For a source state, the sender generates the authenticated message using his/her key and broadcasts the authenticated message.
3. Veri cation: Each user can verify the authenticity of the broadcast message.
Denote by X 1 X n the direct product of sets X 1 ; : : :X n , and by p i the projection mapping of X 1 X n on X i ( i.e., p i : X 1 X n ?! X i de ned by p i (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :; x n ) = x i ). Let g 1 : X 1 ?! Y 1 and g 2 : X 2 ?! Y 2 be two mappings; we denote the direct product of g 1 and g 2 by g 1 g 2 (i.e., g 1 g 2 : X 1 X 2 ?! Y 1 Y 2 de ned by g 1 g 2 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = (g 1 (x 1 ); g 2 (x 2 ))). The identity mapping on a set X is denoted by 1 X .
De nition6. Let C = (S; M; E; f) and C i = (S; M i ; E i ; f i ); i = 1; 2; : : :; n be authentication codes. We call (C; C 1 ; C 2 ; : : :; C n ) a multireceiver authentication code (MRA-code) if there exist two mappings : E ?! E 1 E n and : M ?! M 1 M n such that for any (s; e) 2 S E and any 1 i n, the following identity holds
Let i = p i and i = p i . Then we have for each (s; e) 2 S E i f(s; e) = f i (1 S i )(s; e):
We assume that for each i the mappings i : E ?! E i and i : M ?! M i are surjective. We also assume that for each code C i the probability distribution on the source states is the same with that in the A-code C, and the probability distribution on E i is derived from that of E and the mapping i . Let T denote the sender and R 1 ; : : :; R n denote the receivers. In order to authenticate a message, the sender and the receivers follow the following protocol.
1. The KDC (or the sender) randomly chooses a key e 2 E and privately transmits e to T and e i = i (e) to the receiver R i for all 1 i n.
2. If T wants to send a source state s 2 S to all the receivers, T computes m = f(s; e) 2 M and broadcasts it to all receivers. 3. Receiver R i checks whether a source state s such that f i (s; e i ) = i (m)
exists. If such an s exists, the message m is accepted as authentic. Otherwise m is rejected. We adopt the Kerckho principle that everything in the system except the actual keys of the sender and receivers is public. This includes the probability distribution of the source states and the sender's keys. From De nition 6 we know that the probability distribution of the sender's key induces a probability distribution on each receiver's key. Attackers could be outsiders who do not have access to any key information, or insiders who have some key information. We only need to consider the latter group as it is at least as powerful as the former. We consider the systems that protect against the coalition of groups of up to a maximum size of receivers, and study impersonation and substitution attacks.
Assume there are n receivers R 1 ; : : :; R n . Let L = fi 1 ; : : :i`g f1; : : :; ng, E L = E i1 E i`a nd R L = fR i1 ; ; R i`g . We consider the attack from R L on a receiver R i , where i 6 2 L.
Impersonation attack: R L , after receiving their secret keys, send a message m to R i . R L is successful if m is accepted by R i as authentic. We denote by P I i; L] the success probability of R L in performing an impersonation attack on R i . This can be expressed as
where e L 2 E L .
Substitution attack: R L , after observing a message m that is transmitted by the sender, replace m with another message m 0 . R L is successful if m 0 is accepted by R i as authentic. We denote by P S i; L], the success probability of R L in performing a substitution attack on R i . We have,
The following two bounds are generalisation of Simmons ' 16] 
A (w; n) MRA-code is an MRA-code in which there are n receivers such that no set of w ? 1 receivers can construct a fraudulent codeword acceptable by another receiver. We note that in this de nition, the only requirement is that the chance of success of the attackers is less than one but it is possible that some coalition of attackers can have a better chance of success than an outsider. Lemma 9. A su cient condition for a (w; n) MRA-code to be perfect against impersonation is that P(e i je L ) = P(e i ) for all w-subsets L fig (i = 2 L) of f1; : : :; ng.
Proof is given in the Appendix I. It should also be noted that an (w; n) MRA-code which is perfect for impersonation is not necessarily perfect for substitution, as the following example shows. 0)). Thus L can calculate f(x) and g(x), and so P S i; L] = 1.
We de ne the deception probability of a (w; n) MRA-system as P D = maxfP I ; P S g. Theorem10. Let (C; C 1 ; : : :; C n ) be a (w; n) MRA-code. Assume that P D 1=q and suppose there is a uniform probability distribution on the source states S. Then The bounds are tight and there exists a system that satis es the bounds with equality.
Proof is given in the Appendix I
Comparison of the bounds with KO's bounds: Theorem 10 gives combinatorial bounds for general (w; n) MRA-codes on the size of the transmitter and receivers' key when probability of deception is known. It also lower bounds the required redundancy in terms of the deception probabilities. KO's bounds only apply to (w; n) MRA-codes that are perfect against impersonation and can be seen as special cases of the combinatorial bounds derived above. Appendix II we give a more detailed comparison of the two sets of bounds.
3 Constructions DFY 4] gave two constructions for MRA-codes: one based on polynomials and the other based on nite geometries. KO showed that the polynomial construction is optimal and has the minimum number of keys for transmitter and receivers (Theorem 9 and 11 in 10] and produces the shortest length tag for the codewords. No other optimal construction is known so far. In this section we use error correcting codes (E-codes) to construct MRA-codes. First, we present two constructions which can be used to derive an MRA-code from an arbitrary E-code and then show that the constructions result in new optimal MRA-codes. An linear n; k] code C over GF(q) is a linear subspace of GF(q) n with dimension k. The minimum distance d C of C is de ned by d C = min 06 =u2C w(u), where w(u) is the number of nonzero coordinates of u. A k n matrix G over GF(q) is called a generator matrix of C if its row vectors generate the linear subspace C. For a linear code C its dual code, denoted by C ? , is de ned by C ? = fu 2 GF(q) n ; uv T = 0 for all v 2 Cg:
We brie y recall DFY's polynomial construction as it makes it easier to describe Construction I. DFY polynomial construction: Assume there is a sender T, and n receivers R 1 ; : : :; R n . The key for T consists of two random polynomials P 0 (x) and P 1 (x), of degree at most w ? 1, with coe cients in GF(q). The key for R i consists of P 0 (i) and P 1 (i). For a source state s 2 GF(q), T broadcasts (s; A(x)) where A(x) = P 0 (x)+sP 1 (x): R i accepts (s; A(x)) as authentic if A(i) = P 0 (i)+sP 1 (i): It is proved in 4] that no group of w?1 receivers can perform an impersonation or substitution attacks against a single receiver, with a probability greater than 1=q, the construction provides the following parameters P I = P S = 1=q, jE i j = q 2 , for all 1 i n, jEj = q 2w and jMj = q w jSj.
3.1 Construction I Let C be a linear n; k] code over GF(q) with a generator matrix G 2 GF(q) k n .
We construct an MRA-code with n receivers from C in the following way. Assume that S = GF(q) is the set of source states and G is publicly known. In general the MRA-code derived from an E-code is not optimal and does not satisfy bounds in Theorem 10. In the following we will show that for a well-known class of E-codes the construction results in optimal MRA-codes. A maximum distance separable (MDS) E-code has maximum possible minimum distance and its parameters satisfy d C = n ? k + 1. We are only interested in linear MDS codes. An important property of MDS codes is given in the following theorem. This
That is the resulting (w; n) MRA-code can protect against the largest size set of cheaters. Using this result and theorem 12 it is straightforward to prove the following. 
Construction II
Construction I can be seen as a generalisation of DFY's construction. Construction II is based on the properties of the dual code and can be used for large size sources which makes it of practical interest. We rst describe the construction and then discuss its properties. The basic idea is to use vectors of dual code for veri cation process. The sender's secret key is an` w matrix U which de nes the generator matrix G = I`j U] of a linear code. To authenticate a source state s 2 S the sender generates the codeword c = sG and broadcasts it to the receivers. Each receiver R i has a codeword d i of the dual code. To verify authenticity of a broadcasted vector x, receiver R i calculates x d i (` ' denotes vector inner product) and if it is zero, it accepts the codeword as authentic. Let S GF(q)`denote the set of source states obtained by de ning an equivalence relation over GF(q)`nf0g as follows: s s 0 () s = rs 0 for some 0 6 = r 2 GF(q). It is easy to verify that this relation is in fact an equivalence relation. We de ne S as the set of equivalence classes obtained from . It follows that jSj = q`?1 q?1 = q`? 1 = + q + 1. The three phases of Construction II are as follows.
1. Key distribution The sender T randomly chooses an` w matrix G 2 GF(q)` w ) (and so I`j U] is the generator matrix of a linear `+w;`] code in its systematic form). Assume that q n (this assumption is not necessary 1 ).
T chooses n distinct elements x 1 ; : : :; x n 2 GF(q)( these elements are public and are used as the identities of the receivers), and then calculates and secretly transmits U(1; x i ; : : :; x w?1 i ) T = i 2 GF(q)` 1 to R i , which consists of the secret key of R i ; i = 1; : : :; n. Theorem16. Construction II results in a (w; n) multireceiver A-code with P I = P S = 1=q. It has the following parameters jSj = q`? 1 q ? 1 ; jMj = q w jSj; jEj = q`w and jE i j = q`:
Proof. First, we prove that P I = P S = 1=q. It is su cient to show that for each and the probability of success in each attack is P I = 1 q and P S = 1 q : The corollary follows from the theorem when`= 2. the resulting MRA-code meets the bounds of Theorem 10 and hence is optimal. It is interesting to note that for w = n = 1, the above construction results in a conventional (one-sender to one-receiver) A-code with the following parameters jSj = q`? 1 q ? 1 ; jMj = qjSj; jEj = jE 1 j = q`; and the probability of success in impersonation and substitution is given by is P I = 1 q and P S = 1 q , respectively. Conventional A-code with these parameters has been constructed from nite geometries 1]. In particular, for`= 2, The A-code has the same parameters as the A-code due to Gilbert, MacWilliams and Sloane 7] . We note that Construction II is more suitable for MRA-codes with large source space. In the DFY construction and Construction I, the order of the eld GF(q) determines the lower bound on the success probabilities in impersonation and substitution, and at the same time bounds the size of the source that can be used in the system (jSj q). This can result in ine cient constructions for larger sources. For example a source of size 2 100 results in probability of deception lower bounded by 2 ?100 which is unnecessarily low. The price paid for this low probability is bigger key sizes which for practical applications is not acceptable. This restriction is removed in Construction II, and by choosing appropriatet he size of source can be increased to the required level. (ii) Assume that L i = f1; : : :; i ? 1; i + 1; : : :; wg; i = 1; : : :; w. We have, ( ( 1 q ) w : Since S is assumed to be uniformly distributed, we know that H(MjE) = H(S) = log jSj. Hence jMj = 2 log jMj 2 H(M) q w jSj, which proves (iii).
The bounds are tight as in the next sections we will give constructions that meet them with equality.
